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Maintaining the Energy Security of Turkey in the Era of Geopolitical Turmoil 
 
Ibrahim Said ARINC 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The energy security of Turkey is very much interconnected with geopolitical developments 
due to its dependence on imported energy resources, especially on natural gas. Turkey, 
moreover, is a natural energy hub for Europe but its ability to provide the energy bridge 
between the Middle East and Caucasus hydrocarbons suppliers and European markets is 
being adversely affected by geopolitical tensions in the neighbouring region. The Russian 
intervention in Ukraine and the security and humanitarian crisis in Syria are just two high-
profile instances of wider geopolitical developments which affect Turkey’s ability to meet its 
own rising growing needs as well as its ambition to act as Europe’s energy bridge. This paper 
argues that in order to meet its foreign policy goals in regard to energy not only does Turkey 
need to ensure the return of peace to neighbouring regions, but also should adjust its own 
domestic policies as the first step for being able to respond constructively to external 
developments. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Energy security has become a very popular discussion topic within the discipline of 
international relations. The recent geopolitical developments in the world have made energy 
policies a main component of foreign policy decision making process. The annexation of 
Crimea by the Russian Federation and the Syria crisis could be regarded as the most 
challenging foreign policy issues of this decade. In this tense environment of Eurasia, 
Turkey’s energy security is not directly affected but energy security concerns have been 
raised regarding future risks of energy supply disruptions.  Although energy security issues 
are mostly discussed in relation to price risks, the possibility of the use of energy resources as 
a foreign policy tool endangers the energy systems.  In the literature, the doyen of the energy 
industry Daniel Yergin identifies energy security as “the availability of sufficient supplies at 
affordable prices”.１ He also comments that every country interprets the definition of energy 
security with its own dynamics.
２
   
 
Geographically Turkey is located at the heart of Eurasia, neighbouring the Middle East and 
the European Union. Moreover, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea give Turkey access 
to a wider geography. Turkey is a candidate for admission to the European Union and has 
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carried out important reforms in order to comply with EU Acquis. Turkey is considered to be 
a developing country and has had significant impetus in the last decade in terms of economic 
and social development. The Turkish economy annually grew significantly and became a 
centre of attraction for foreign direct investment. In 2014 Turkey ranked as the 16
th
 largest 
economy in the world and the 6
th
 biggest economy of Europe. Despite the global economic 
crisis of 2008, the Turkish economy had an annual growth rate of 5% between the years of 
2004-2014. Parallel to the annual growth rate, primary energy demand had a 5% annual 
increase in the last decade. We can easily argue from analogy that the growing Turkish 
economy needs energy to maintain its growth rate.  
However, Turkey is not as lucky as its Middle Eastern neighbours in that the Turkish energy 
system is very much dependent on energy imports. The growing energy demand has been met 
by imported resources and the import proportion of primary energy production exceeded the 
level of 70% in the last decade.
３
 This dependence on energy imports and the fast growth rate 
of the economy have created risks for maintaining energy security.  
Among other energy resources the energy system of Turkey is very much dependent on 
natural gas. Therefore the risks of natural gas supply disruptions and source diversification 
issues directly affect the energy security policy of Turkey. In this paper, the author will 
analyse the energy profile of Turkey and the measures to be taken in order to mitigate the 
risks to energy security in relation to the natural gas supply, considering the energy policies 
and foreign policy challenges that Turkey faces. 
 
ENERGY PROFILE OF TURKEY 
 
According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, Turkey’s primary energy demand 
amounted to 125.4 Million Tons of Oil Equivalents (Mtoe) in 2014.
４
 Turkey was ranked as 
the 19
th
 biggest energy market in the world in terms of primary energy consumption. 
According to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey (MENR), primary 
energy consumption will reach the level of 218 Mtoe by 2023.
５
  
Chart 1: 
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Source: MENR 
On the other hand, in Turkey the electricity generation reached the level of 251 GWh in 2014. 
Within this electricity generation the sources are distributed as follows: Thermal 79.5% 
GWh, hydropower 16.1% and other renewables 4.3%.
６
 If we analyse the source based 
electricity generation, natural gas accounted for 47.85%, coal 30.27%, hydropower 16.13%, 
wind 3.38%, geothermal 0.94%, fuel oil 0.85%, and other sources accounted for 0.58 % of 
the total production (see Chart 1).  
In order to maintain the competence and functionality of the energy market, the Turkish 
government has carried out several reforms and promoted private sector investments in order 
to meet the growing energy demand. In 2014 private electricity generation companies 
produced 72% of the total supply.
７
 At the end of 2014, the total installed electricity capacity 
of Turkey reached the level of 69.520 MW, from the level of 36.824 MW in 2004.
８
 It is 
obvious that the installed power capacity of Turkey has approximately doubled in ten years. 
The hydropower, natural gas and coal based power plants still hold the majority of the total 
capacity (see Table 1). In the last decade, the share of geothermal, wind and solar increased 
significantly. The share of fuel oil and oil based thermal plants decreased as the Turkish 
government had targets for promoting environment friendly electricity generation. 
 
Table 1: Source Based Installed Capacity of Turkey 
Year 
Thermal 
Hydrolic 
Geothermal, Wind and 
Solar Coal Natural Gas Other 
2004 22,5% 30,8% 12,2% 34,3% 0,1% 
2005 23,5% 31,6% 11,6% 33,2% 0,1% 
2006 25,2% 31,2% 11,2% 32,3% 0,2% 
Source Based Electricity Generation of Turkey 
in 2014 
Natural Gas 47,85%
Coal 30,27%
Hydropower 16,13%
Wind 3,38%
Geothermal 0,94%
Fuel Oil 0,85%
Other Sources 0,58%
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2007 24,7% 31,5% 10,6% 3,3% 0,4% 
2008 24,1% 32,1% 9,7% 33,1% 0,9% 
2009 23,5% 32,5% 9,6% 32,5% 1,9% 
2010 24,0% 32,5% 8,6% 32,0% 2,9% 
2011 23,6% 30,2% 10,3% 32,4% 3,5% 
2012 22,0% 30,1% 9,4% 32,4% 4,2% 
2013 19,6% 31,6% 9,2% 34,8% 4,8% 
2014 21,1% 30,9% 8,2% 34,0% 5,9% 
 
Source: MENR 
NATURAL GAS MARKET OF TURKEY 
 
Among other resources natural gas plays the most crucial role in the energy sector of Turkey. 
Turkey had a natural gas consumption of 48 Billion Cubic Metres (BCM) in 2014.
９
 Turkey 
is a very important natural gas market in global terms and Turkey is the 6
th
 largest gas market 
of Europe.
１０
 However, Turkish indigenous natural gas production only meets 2% of the total 
natural gas consumption.
１１
 BOTAŞ is the major player in the natural gas market and 
operates the country’s natural gas grid and imports approximately 80% of its total natural gas 
consumption. The Turkish natural gas market is very much dependent on Russia, with in 
excess of 58% of gas consumed by BOTAŞ and other private companies coming from 
Gazprom (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Long Term Natural Gas Agreements of Turkey (under operation) 
Source 
Annual 
Quantity 
(BCM) 
Percentage 
Algeria (LNG) 4,4 8% 
Nigeria (LNG) 1,2 2% 
Iran 10 19% 
Russian Federation 30 58% 
 Azerbaijan  6,6 13% 
TOTAL 51,8 100% 
Source: MENR 
Map 1: Natural Gas Grid, Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines of Turkey 
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Source: BOTAŞ 
The other major risk for the Turkish natural gas sector is the low capacity of natural gas 
storage facilities. In Turkey there is only one existing natural gas storage facility, operated by 
TPAO with an annual capacity of 2,6 BCM. There is an ongoing project of BOTAŞ in the 
Salt Lake district of Turkey with an annual capacity of 1 BCM that will be operational in 
2018.
１２
 If we compare the storage facilities of Turkey with those of other countries it is clear 
that Turkey has operational risks for natural gas usage (see Table 3). The main risk could be 
considered to be for the natural gas based power plants and households. As mentioned above 
the share of natural gas in electricity generation is approximately 50% and any gas supply 
disruption could cause a domino effect in the Turkish energy system. 
Countries 
Rate of Storage Capacity / 
Total Consumption 
Rate of Storage Capacity / 
Consumption of Households 
USA 18 48 
Russian Federation 27 61 
Ukraine 49 109 
Germany 19 105 
France 20 52 
Italy 30 65 
Turkey 5 20 
Source: World Bank 
 
TURKEY AS A STRONG PARTNER OF EU NATURAL GAS DIVERSIFICATION 
PROJECTS 
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Turkey as a candidate for EU membership is an active partner in the diversification of supply 
projects of the EU. The Southern Corridor, for example, will enable the EU to create the 
fourth natural gas corridor in order to diversify natural gas routes and resources as an 
alternative to North European, North African and Russian routes. In the first place the 
Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline project was developed for the realisation of the Southern 
Corridor. Although the Nabucco project failed due to the decision on its expensive tariff 
system by the Shah Deniz Natural Gas Field investors of Azerbaijan (the field operator is BP 
and the Azeri Government was active in this decision), the TANAP (Trans Anatolian 
Pipeline) project which has the same philosophy is now under construction.  
 
The TANAP project is envisaged to be commissioned in 2018 for the Turkish branch and in 
2019 for the European branch. TANAP will be extended to the European Union via the 
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The project is designed to have a maximum annual capacity 
of 31 BCM; in the first phase it will deliver 6 BCM to Turkey and 10 BCM to the European 
Union.
１３
 In Turkish territory the project starts from the Turkish-Georgian border 
interconnecting with the South Caucasus pipeline and will end at the Turkish-Greek Border 
to interconnect with the TAP Pipeline. The project will also have two exit points to 
interconnect with the Turkish gas grid.
１４
 
 
TURKISH ENERGY POLICY AND ENERGY SECURITY 
 
Turkish energy policy is based on the principles of maintaining energy supply security, 
promotion of alternative energy resources, exploitation of indigenous energy resources, 
sustainability, and liberalisation of energy markets and promotion of energy efficiency.
１５
 
These policy fundamentals are envisaged to be realised in accordance with global energy 
dynamics and the geopolitical realities of Turkey.  
Energy supply security is planned to be maintained with the promotion of indigenous 
resource based energy generation facilities and diversification of energy supply sources. The 
other significant strategy is supporting the increase of renewables in total primary energy 
consumption. The diversification of natural gas sources and realisation of investments to 
increase the resilience of the natural gas system is also suitable to maintain the energy 
security. 
In order to meet the growing energy demand, the Turkish government also aims at the 
creation of a better investment environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
private sector in the energy system. Moreover, a functional and liquid energy market is 
another target for the Turkish government in order to maintain the long term energy 
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investments. The government set targets mainly to be realised by 2023, the centenary of the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey. These main targets are: 
 The installed electricity capacity of Turkey will exceed the level of 110.000 MW by 
2023, 
 Two nuclear power plants will be operational and the third one will be under 
construction by 2023,  
 Utilisation of the proven reserves of coal and lignite by 2023, 
 Expanding the annual natural gas storage capacity up to 5,6 BCM by 2020, 
 Increasing the share of renewables to 30% of the total electricity generation by 2023, 
 Utilisation of all hydropower and geothermal potential by 2023, 
 Increasing the wind power installed capacity to 20.000 MW by 2023, 
 Increasing the energy efficiency per capita up to 20% by 2023, 
 Decreasing the single resource dependence on any country at a minimum to below 
50% of total natural gas imports by 2020, 
 Decreasing the share of natural gas to below 38% of total electricity generation.１６ 
 
CHALLENGES FOR MAINTAINING THE NATURAL GAS SUPPLY SECURITY 
OF TURKEY 
 
Despite the fact that government sets targets to diversify energy sources, it is obvious that 
natural gas is expected to maintain its dominant role in the Turkish energy system in the 
following decades. Therefore, the risks for natural gas supply disruptions or political turmoil 
have to be minimised with strong concrete measures. As Turkey has had very strong energy 
demand in the past decade and did not have so many options to meet the rising natural gas 
demand, the Russian Federation has kept its dominant position in the Turkish gas market. On 
the other hand Turkey has encountered political risks with developments in the Middle East 
that have the potential to endanger secure future natural gas supplies from both existing 
routes and prospective alternatives from the region. But before commenting on the political 
environment, it will be more convenient to focus on the structural problems of the Turkish 
natural gas market. 
In Turkey, the liberalisation of the electricity market has made significant progress in the last 
decade. Private companies are active in electricity generation and trade. PMUM is established 
for daily basis electricity trade between sellers and buyers. Although the price cap of 
electricity is still determined by the government, Turkey has a young liberal electricity 
market at a certain level. However, the situation is not the same in the natural gas market. The 
targets set by Natural Gas Market Law 4646 could not be applied and there is a need for a 
new and contemporary natural gas market law immediately.  
The roles of BOTAŞ and the private companies have to be clarified by the government in 
order to create a liquid natural gas market. Besides, the same as in the electricity market, 
government still determines the natural gas sales prices, which creates risk for private natural 
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gas importers and creates a burden for BOTAŞ. In some periods of time BOTAŞ subsidises 
the natural gas prices and this creates a loss to the Turkish Treasury. At the same time private 
natural gas importers are very cautious about taking on the future risks of gas price changes 
and reluctant to sign new gas contracts, although the Turkish gas market is growing and there 
is room for new gas contracts in future. The other important point is the need to create storage 
facilities but there are many uncertainties deterring the private sector from making 
investments. The existing regulations do not create a feasible environment to attract storage 
facility investments.  Therefore, in winter time the Turkish gas market faces demand higher 
than the supply capability of the natural gas market and storage facilities and this creates 
temporary disruption to natural gas power generation facilities and industrial areas. It is 
obvious that upgrading of the existing system and storage facilities has the potential to make 
the necessary investments feasible, however the existing legal environment of the natural gas 
market is not sufficiently efficient to attract investors. 
The other structural challenge is the future interconnections with neighbours of Turkey. The 
Turkish natural gas grid is only interconnected to Greece. There is an ongoing investment by 
BOTAŞ to establish interconnection with Iraq. However, Turkey-Bulgaria and Turkey-
Georgia interconnections could increase the liquidity of the natural gas market in Turkey.  
 
GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY SECURITY 
 
Turkey neighbours a very problematic geographical region. The civil wars that broke out 
after the ‘Arab Spring’ and the political turmoil in Ukraine endanger the security of energy 
for Turkey. These geopolitical developments and Turkey’s ties with the actors in these 
political crises have significant potential to limit the options for taking measures to mitigate 
the future risks of an energy security crisis.  
1- The Russian annexation of Crimea and war in Ukraine 
The ongoing civil war in Ukraine could be considered to be the biggest threat to Europe since 
World War II. The political turmoil of 2013 and the aggressive actions of Ukrainian President 
Yanukovich towards protestors resulted in political division of Ukraine between reformists 
and Russian supporters. In March 2014 Russia annexed the autonomous region of Crimea as 
a consequence of the so-called vote for independence in the Ukraine referendum.
１７
 
Moreover, eastern provinces of Ukraine proclaimed support for the Russian invasion and 
civil war broke out between Ukrainian authorities and pro-Russian provinces.  
The Ukrainian civil war has a direct effect on the natural gas relations of Eurasia. The share 
of Russian gas in the EU market is approximately 25% of the total consumption.
１８
 
Historically Ukraine has been the main export route for Russia and Ukraine was harbouring 
80% of Russian gas transited to European markets. We have already seen that the natural gas 
crises of 2005, 2007 and 2009 endangered the security of gas transit via Ukraine.  
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Although the European Union has backed Ukraine in almost every dispute with Russia, in 
order to isolate the gas disruptions caused by the potential threat to the Ukrainian route, the 
Nord Stream pipeline project was developed and commissioned in late 2011, directly 
connecting the Russian gas system via the Baltic Sea to Germany.
１９
 The other by-pass 
project is named South Stream, connecting Russian gas fields directly to Bulgaria, targeting 
the south-eastern gas markets of Europe that have been suspended as a result of ongoing 
political tension in Ukraine and legislative obstacles issued by the European Union.
２０
 Both 
projects aimed to by-pass Ukraine and decrease the dependence on Ukrainian territory for 
transit.  
On the other hand, Ukraine has taken measures to decrease its dependence on Russian gas 
and since 2005 has decreased the share of Russian gas in total consumption from 77% to 36% 
in 2004. The main contribution to this change has been the reverse flow of gas from the 
European Union via the existing interconnections with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
２１
 
Turkey is very much dependent on Russian gas, BOTAŞ is the biggest gas customer of 
Gazprom and Turkey is the second biggest natural gas market for Russia. Turkey consumes 
natural gas from Russia via two separate routes. The first route is called the Balkan line, with 
annual capacity of 14 BCM, and the second route is called Blue Stream Pipeline with annual 
capacity of 16 BCM. In total Turkey annually consumes 30 BCM of Russian gas. Turkey is 
the last consumer of Russian gas from the Balkan gas pipeline that is transited via Ukraine. 
Therefore any crisis and disruption in Ukraine has the potential to directly affect Turkish 
consumption of Russian gas. It is announced that the transit agreement between Russia and 
Ukraine will expire in 2019 and this endangers the gas flows via the Balkan line.
２２
 During 
the visit of President Putin to Turkey in December 2014, the Turkish Stream Project, which is 
the new version of South Stream, was announced.
２３
 The project is designed to connect the 
Russian system via the Black Sea to the Turkish gas grid. It was envisaged that Turkey would 
replace the gas imports via the Balkan line with the Turkish Stream project, thus eliminating 
the disruption risk caused by any crisis in Ukraine. Moreover, with the realisation of the 
Turkish Stream Project, Russia would have an opportunity to access south Eastern Europe via 
the Turkish-Greek border. However, on November 24, 2015 Turkey shot down a Russian 
aircraft as a result of violation of Turkish airspace near the Syrian border and immediately 
Russia declared the suspension of the Turkish Stream project. 
２４
  
 
Although Turkey and Russia have fostered their bilateral political and economic relations 
over the last decade, the Syria issue caused the biggest crisis in Turkey-Russia relations since 
the First World War. Turkey shot down a Russian military aircraft on November 24, 2014 as 
a result of violation of Turkish airspace. Russian President Putin considered this event a very 
hostile act and issued decrees to apply widespread economic embargoes and military 
measures in order to put pressure on Turkey. Although Gazprom and Russian energy officials 
made statements that there would not be any natural gas disruptions on contracted volumes of 
gas flows to Turkey, the Russian President declared that the Turkish Stream project was 
suspended as a result of ruined bilateral relations. The threat of Russian gas disruptions could 
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be considered one of the most significant risks for the energy system of Turkey which is 
heavily dependent on natural gas imports. Moreover, if Russia and Ukraine do not extend the 
transit agreement after 2019, Turkey and other Balkan countries will face disruption of gas 
flows. 
2- War in Syria and uncertainty in Iraq 
Turkey neighbours Syria which is the most complicated regional crisis in contemporary 
politics. The ongoing war in Syria creates a threat to the energy security of Turkey and 
endangers the bilateral relations with Russia and Iran. The Assad regime, backed mainly by 
Russia and Iran, is fighting with the Syrian opposition supported by the Sunni Arab states, the 
US and Turkey. Political efforts to find a lasting settlement have failed several times due to 
Russia and Iran backing the Assad regime. On the other hand, the opposition is divided into 
several sections and the radical Sunni movement ISIS appeared as another threat not only to 
Syria but also to Iraq. The existing Syria issue has the potential to create a ‘spill over’ effect 
that would cause a Sunni-Shia war in the Middle East. The implications of the Syrian war for 
the energy security of Turkey could be considered to be that a potential crisis with Iran might 
endanger the existing natural gas supplies from Iran to the Turkish market. 
Iran was under UN embargo until January 2016 and it has limited capacity of efficient natural 
gas infrastructure. Turkey and Iran bilateral relations are also fragile. The two countries have 
strong historical ties and deep historical clashes at the same time. Moreover, the 
contemporary problems of the Middle East increase the tension between Iran and Turkey 
from time to time. Turkey and Iran are on opposite sides in the Syria crisis, yet  Turkey is the 
biggest consumer of Iranian gas and as mentioned above consumes 10 BCM annually. Iran is 
Turkey’s second largest natural gas supplier, so that any political crisis with Iran could 
endanger the security of natural gas supplies to the Turkish market. 
Iraq is another area of uncertainty as the integrity of the country is in danger. The ongoing 
disagreement between the Federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) over the share of hydrocarbon revenues and the Federal budget prompted 
independent oil exportation by the KRG. Turkey has traditional ties with the people of the 
Kurdish region and pursues a very sensitive foreign policy to maintain the integrity of Iraq 
together with supporting the stability of the KRG. Turkish oil and gas companies are active in 
the natural gas and oil business in the KRG region and future natural gas exports are on the 
agenda as a part of the diversification of natural gas supplies in future. According to KRG 
officials, the KRG will be able to export natural gas to Turkey in 2018 with a maximum 
annual capacity of 10 BCM.
２５
 However, the political instability and the activities of ISIS in 
Iraq have the potential to endanger the stability of Iraq and the KRG which may influence the 
future gas export options to Turkey. 
If the increasing tension between Arabs and Kurds, Sunnis and Shias is escalated the future 
natural gas supplies from Iran and Iraq (KRG) may be affected in a negative way. Therefore, 
a lasting peace in Syria and establishment of a functioning federal state system in Iraq are 
necessary to mitigate the risks of further turmoil in the region. Although Iran is a historical 
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friend and neighbour of Turkey, if their political interests are contradictory the natural gas 
supplies from Iran to Turkey are at risk of being interrupted. 
3- Isolation of Turkey from eastern Mediterranean 
The eastern Mediterranean region could be regarded as the most problematic region for 
Turkey over the last five years due to the long standing tensiosn in  Cyprus, Israel’s 
aggressive acts towards Gaza and the coup d’état in Egypt. On the other hand, the natural gas 
discoveries in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Israel in the Tamar and Leviathan 
fields, the Aphrodite field in the EEZ of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) and the Zohr 
field in the EEZ of Egypt gave a new cooperation or conflict dimension to the eastern 
Mediterranean region.
 ２６
 After the last discovery of the Zohr field in Egypt, the proven gas 
reserves of the eastern Mediterranean have reached the level of 2.8 Trillion Cubic Meters 
(TCM).
 ２７
 If the necessary investments are realised, the region is expected to have 15-20 
BCM annual gas export capacity.
２８
Turkey is seen as one of the target markets or transit 
routes for the exploitation of the gas reserves discovered. Moreover, Turkey could be 
considered to be the best option for the commercialisation of the fields as the Turkish market 
is the largest one in the region and has rising demand.
２９
 However, the isolation of Turkey 
from the geopolitical dynamics endangers the projects with a Turkish option.   
The Cyprus issue could be considered to be the most complicated foreign policy problem of 
Turkey and one that endangers its access to eastern Mediterranean gas reserves.  
Nevertheless, Turkey has made significant efforts to reach a settlement on the island, but the 
two parties could not find any common ground to decrease the tension and establish a lasting 
settlement. In 1960, the state of Cyprus was established by Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 
accordance with an international agreement guaranteed by the Turkish, Greek and British 
governments. However, in 1963, the Greek Cypriots attempted to isolate Turkish Cypriots 
from government institutions that were in breach of the agreement and the Constitution.
３０
  
In 1974 Greece attempted to annex the island, which was resisted by Turkey in accordance 
with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Unfortunately, since the 1970s the issue has not been 
settled despite the enormous support of the UN, the USA, the EU, Turkey and Greece. The 
admission of the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) to the EU as the State of Cyprus in 
2004 has destroyed the hopes for a lasting settlement. 
Turkish-Israeli bilateral relations were also ruined after the raid by the Israeli Defence Force 
on the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010. This resulted in the breaking off of the diplomatic 
relations between Turkey and Israel, which could be considered as the biggest crisis in 
bilateral relations since the establishment of the State of Israel. On the other hand Israel’s 
natural gas discoveries provide a great area for cooperation between the two countries, as 
Turkey could be the most feasible natural gas market for Israeli gas companies and east 
Mediterranean gas could be a means for Turkey to diversify its gas sources and create 
competition with the existing long term gas contracts. 
 
Map 2: EastMed Map of Claims, Conflicts and Disputed Parcels 
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Source: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) 
 
Egypt has been considered a natural ally of Turkey since the latter’s establishment, however, 
the coup d’état and imprisonment of President Morsi in 2013 created huge turbulence 
between Turkey and Egypt. Both countries recalled their ambassadors and they now have 
limited diplomatic communication. The frozen relations of Turkey and Egypt have 
complicated any natural gas project considering the possibility of Egyptian natural gas 
reserves being exported to Turkey. 
Another problematic issue is the increasing military presence of Russia offshore in the 
eastern Mediterranean and the activities of the Russian military base in Tartus, Syria. The 
ongoing Syrian crisis may impede the natural gas projects until a lasting settlement in Syria is 
found. It would be very usual for Russia as a major gas supplier to Turkey and Europe to 
have a negative attitude towards eastern Mediterranean gas reserves that could compete with 
Russian gas in the market. 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The energy security of Turkey is very much interconnected with geopolitical developments 
due to its dependence on imported energy resources, especially on natural gas. The 
government has set targets until 2023 to reduce the risks to the functionality of the energy 
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system. However, the strong energy demand and significant growth rate of that demand have 
complicated efforts to realise those targets. 
The natural gas market has structural challenges as has been mentioned, and yet the need for 
future investment and diversification of sources is clear. However, the investments are 
realised by BOTAŞ in the existing system and measures have to be taken by the government 
to encourage private companies to make investments in system upgrade and storage facilities. 
Therefore a new natural gas market law and reorganisation of the actors in the natural gas 
system will serve the energy security of Turkey. In relation to the new natural gas market 
law, the philosophy underlying the natural gas strategies has to be set out in a new “Natural 
Gas Strategy Paper” defining the ultimate targets for a better functioning natural gas system. 
Within this strategy, Turkey has to claim its international role as a natural gas hub and take 
steps to achieve it. As Turkey is a candidate for admission to the EU and has a growing 
natural gas market, Turkey has the commercial and political ability to introduce an Anatolian 
Gas Centre, which would provide an answer to the expectations of the producer and 
consumer countries’ trading and exchange regimes by acting as a ‘regional gas balancing 
point’.３１ With the realisation of the AGC concept, Turkey would gain a great advantage in 
satisfying its natural gas supply security and an ability to negotiate price reductions due to 
supply diversification in accordance with the energy security targets set by the 
government.
３２
 
On the other hand, Turkey has to make the best efforts to minimise the geopolitical risks 
affecting energy relations with other countries. The reorganisation of the natural gas market 
and its actors may give Turkish companies more independent space to establish private 
relations with the foreign companies that could help in reducing geopolitical risks for energy 
security. In other words, if Turkey could establish a semi-independent energy system and 
base its relations with foreign partners solely on mutual economic interests, the political risks 
would have less impact on energy relations. 
Finally, Turkey should strengthen its efforts to achieve full membership of the EU. The 
energy security risks of Turkey and the EU overlap in many areas. The Southern Corridor 
concept will definitely serve the energy security of both Turkey and the EU but further steps 
should be taken to interconnect the Turkish gas market with that of the EU. The 
interconnection of the natural gas grids of Turkey and the EU would provide resilience to 
help overcome any future energy security threats and will be mutually functional and 
beneficial. 
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